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Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar
Turkey is an important actor in terms of migratory regimes and migration man-
agement, as it stands at the junctions of Europe, Asia and Africa. Due to its geo-
political  significance and closeness  both to the EU Area and MENA (Middle 
East and North Africa), Turkey became the nexus of emigration, immigration 
and transit migration. Turkey has been a country of emigration for the last 
fifty  years  since  World  War  II.  The  movement  of  Turkish  guest-workers  to 
Western Europe and especially to Germany has been in the focus of interest. 
However, other countries of destination have become more important, as Turk-
ish firms have expanded their activities in the neighboring countries. In recent 
times, another phenomenon has become apparent. More and more, Turkey has 
also become a country of immigration. Especially migrants from MENA have 
moved to Turkey with its improving standard of living (in comparison to the 
region) and the increasing chances of getting a job (especially in informal sec-
tors). Furthermore, however, some of the immigrants see Turkey as a transit 
country of their long journey to (Western) Europe. This is of special impor-
tance for the EU, since the transit movement via Turkey directly affects the 
immigration control system from Turkey to the EU due to the common Turk-
ish-EU border.
In the context of Turkey’s accession to the EU, the issue of “potential mi-
gration” from Turkey and its impact upon European labor markets became one 
of the concerns of the EU, considering Turkey’s growing population and young 
labor force. In the light of the discussion about the deepening of the EU instead 
of enlargement, the relations between Turkey and the EU followed a stagnat-
ing pattern in the post-Lisbon Treaty period. Since the second half of 2008, un-
der  the  influence  of  conservative  leaders  of  Europe,  such  as  Merkel  and 
Sarkozy, relations between Turkey and the EU almost came to a standstill. Cur-
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rently, privileged partnership as an alternative form to Turkey’s membership is 
among the most controversial issues in the current agenda of EU.
Fears 
Among the fears of the EU with regard to Turkey’s membership, three points, 
which are elaborated below, play the most significant role. Firstly, due to the 
demographics of Turkey, the numbers of seats at the European Parliament will 
decrease, which is not for the sake of current members. Secondly, in terms of 
living standard and GDP per capita, Turkey is below the European average and 
considered as an outlier not fitting into the economic standards. Finally, due to 
the  Muslim  identity  of  Turkey,  there  are  concerns  about  the  disharmony 
between the Christian values of Europe and cultural impacts of Islam.
Too many 
The EU’s demographic trend is characterized by low fertility rates and longev-
ity. Thus, in demographic terms, Europe is facing the problems of an aging and 
shrinking  population  in  addition  to  the  low  labor  force  participation  rates. 
Demographic trends show that West Europe will  mostly rely on the foreign 
labor force in the future. Münz et al. (2007)1 underline the logical necessity of 
migration and postulate that on average a net flow of slightly less than one 
and half million labor migrants per year would be required to keep Europe’s 
economically active population at constant levels. 
With  regard  to  the  future  migration  potential  from  Turkey  to  Ger-
many, the demographic development might become crucial. In the mid-2000s, 
the size of the population was 82 million in Germany and 70 million in Turkey. 
In the last decade, the population grew by 0.1 in Germany and by 1.5 in Turkey. 
In the mid-2000s, 20 % of the total population in Germany was over 65 years of 
age. In Turkey, this ratio remained only at 6 %. Consequently, the population 
development might lead to an excess supply of labor in Turkey, while in Ger-
many it might lead to an excess demand for labor. Taken together that will 
stimulate  incentives  to  migrate  from Turkey to Germany. In comparison to 
Germany, Turkey’s population is increasing; however, this trend will be stabi-
lized as well in the long run.
1 Münz/Straubhaar/Vadean, F./Vadean, N. (2007).
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Too Poor2
Another crucial factor in determining the causes of migration is the contrast in 
the average standard of living among different countries. The choice of indi-
viduals to emigrate based on their increased income earning potentials does 
not follow a linear function, but instead a logarithmic one. This means that 
there is a stronger propensity for an individual to choose to migrate in the case 
of larger income gaps, which becomes weaker in the case of smaller income 
gaps. The propensity for an individual to emigrate may occur long before income 
generation between the host country and the country of origin have equalized be-
cause of a saturation point of migration. Thus, the speed of change is important. It 
makes a big difference whether the income gap is declining rapidly or not.
Figure 1: Per Capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parities USD)* in Turkey and Germany, 1980 to 2008
* In this figure, Purchasing Power Parities USD have been used to reflect the standard of living and its difference   
between Turkey and Germany.
  Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators.
Figure 1 shows the rather wide gap in the average standard of living between 
Turkey and Germany by comparing the per capita GDP measured in purcha-
sing power parities USD. The gap has declined. In 1980, the GDP per capita in 
Turkey reached about 20 % of the German GDP per capita. Today, it reaches 
about 37 %.
2 Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2011, pp. 116–118).
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To illustrate how long it may take to catch up, Figure 2 reflects a simple 
simulation exercise. It is assumed that in the next decades Turkey’s GDP will 
grow faster than Germany’s GDP. (In the mid-2000s, the GDP per capita was 
around 30,000 USD in Germany and 10,000 USD in Turkey).
Figure 2: Simulation of the Gap in Per Capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parities USD)* between 
Turkey and Germany, 2008 to 2050, under the Assumption of Different Annual Growth 
Rates for the GDP
* In this figure, Purchasing Power Parities USD have been used to reflect the standard of living and its differ-
ence between Turkey and Germany.
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators.
The simulation shows that  under  this  assumption, the German GDP grows 
with a constant rate of 2 % per year while the Turkish GDP has to grow by 3 % 
per  year to  keep the  existing gap of  the GDP per  capita  vis-à-vis  Germany 
stable. Turkey requires a more rapid growth of its GDP to compensate for its 
more rapid population growth. If the Turkish economy grows by 4 % per year 
and the German GDP stays at 2 % per year, the Turkish GDP per capita will 
reach half the size of the German GDP per capita by 2040. If it grows by 5 % per 
year, the 2:1 gap is reached by 2025. The simulation exercise is a simple esti-
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mate to illustrate how long the substantial gap of the average standard of liv-
ing will persist between Germany and Turkey. This would be the case even if 
the Turkish economy grows (much) faster than the German one.
Too Muslim
Within the last fifty years of Turkish migration to Western Europe, one dimen-
sion became gradually dominant in defining the image of “Turks” in Europe: 
religion. Turkish  migrants  increasingly  are  defined  and  perceived  as  being 
“Muslim” in the first place, in addition to all their specific characteristics. There 
are several reasons behind this shift. One is unarguably the events of Septem-
ber 11, which somehow increased fears of Muslim communities and contrib-
uted to the rise of Islamophobia. The second reason is the pattern within the 
Turkish diaspora towards conservatism, which reflects itself in the increasing 
number of ethnic and religious associations, in which Turkish migrants are or-
ganized. The internal politics in Turkey is in line with the religious tendencies 
of Turkish community in Europe. This brings the long-standing question under 
discussion one more time: the contradiction between the secular identity of 
Europe and the Islamic tradition of Turkey. The AKP (Justice and Development 
Party)’s victory in the latest political elections makes this question even more 
meaningful and it is worth discussing the challenges that Turkey will face in 
the near future in terms of religion, being the sole Muslim candidate of the 
union.
Too many fears?
Regarding the population developments in Turkey and in the EU – with a fast-
growing population in Turkey and a declining and aging population in the EU – 
and taking into account the gap in the average standard of living, there is a po-
tential for migration flows from Turkey to the EU indeed. This is one (and probably 
the most important) reason why some EU countries (especially Germany) are 
concerned about applying the right of free movement in the case of Turkish 
workers.3 Are  these  fears  justified  by  theoretical  expectations  or  empirical 
evidence? Several studies have attempted to answer these questions; however, 
“migration intention” is a complicated concept whose measurement is fairly 
complex.4 
3 Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2010 a, p. 8).
4 For a detailed review, see Paçacı Elitok (2010).
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The main methodological difficulty for most of these studies lies in the 
fundamental political and institutional change that goes along with a Turkish 
accession to the EU. Turkey becoming a member of the EU and being granted 
the right of free movement for Turkish workers means doubtlessly a unique 
experience with no historical blue-print at all. Thus, if there is a case where the 
famous Lucas-critique5 is well applied, it comes with the changes an EU mem-
bership for Turkey would generate. The methodological key questions are: how 
far can we (1) use experiences in the past to learn something for the future and 
(2) speculate about the migration potential from Turkey to the EU after such a 
fundamental change from strong to no restrictions has taken place? Briefly, 
summarizing the existing empirical evidence6 from all the different studies, 
one thing becomes very clear: the estimations present broadly varying num-
bers. Figures with respect to the volume of potential Turkish migrants from 
Turkey to the EU range between 0.5 to 4.4 million. It is sufficient to say that the 
literature lacks an agreement on a reasonable interval with a minimum and a 
maximum value. The wideness of the range is rather large and quite sensitive 
to the data sets and methodologies that are applied, which brings the reliabil-
ity of numbers into discussion. Forecasting the approximate volume of poten-
tial  migration is quite necessary, especially for policy makers; however, one 
should  be  cautious  when  approaching  the  estimation  literature,  since  the 
range is rather wide and the quality of the data is poor and the methodologies 
are unclear and inconsistent. Moreover, the focus of the debate should rather 
shift  to  the  profile,  the  structure,  the  dynamics,  the  regional  distribution, 
trends and mechanisms of potential migration flows and to the motivation of 
migrants to come to Europe. 
Actually, the question is not so much: how many Turkish workers would 
take use of the right to move freely? The right question is: how many more (or 
5 The Lucas-critique is “that any change in policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models. ... [This con-
clusion] is fundamental; for it implies that comparisons of the effects of alternative policy rules using current macro econo-
metric models are invalid regardless of the performance of these models over the sample period or in ex ante short-term 
forecasting” (Lucas [1976, p. 41]). The Lucas-critique refers to the level of consistency and invariance over time and space. It is 
about the correctness of an extrapolation from past migration patterns to expected migration behavior and it is about the 
possibilities of applying empirical migration experiences from one area to another. Some scholars try to overcome this fun-
damental methodological problem by the inclusion of so-called country-specific effects. In most econometric forecasts the 
country-specific aspects are captured by a country-specific intercept, which remains constant over time. However, it re-
mains more than crucial how the country-specific intercept is defined and applied to Turkey that has had no historical ex-
perience of free migration to Europe. 
6 Paçacı Elitok (2010).
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even less) would move compared to a situation with no right of free move-
ment? Erzan et  al. (2006)7 show that if  Turkey’s  membership process is  en-
dangered and high growth cannot be sustained, 2.7 million people may be pen-
etrating the EU-15 despite the restrictions on the labor mobility. This is more 
than in a scenario with a Turkish EU membership and free movement for Turk-
ish workers. Thus, it is not unrealistic to expect, that under the lack of full EU 
membership and free movement of labor, Turkish migration flows towards the 
EU will be even at higher levels. The migration experience after the Eastern en-
largement has shown that the actual migration flows are fairly below the ex-
pected levels, following the accession. It might be that something like a migra-
tion  hump  will  be  the most  realistic  scenario. There will  be  an increase  of 
migration flows firstly, just after the right of free movement is granted. But 
after a while, it will decrease.8
Potentials9
Migration flows from the EU to Turkey will be determined by various factors 
(income  differentials, unemployment, migrant  networks, migration  policies, 
religion, culture, etc.) in the future. European retirees will keep migrating to 
Turkey, particularly to the Aegean and Mediterranean Area, for their retire-
ment life. The return of people with a Turkish background and also the return 
of retiring Turkish migrants (e.g., first-generation German-Turks) will also be 
an increasing part of potential migration flows from the EU to Turkey. Yet, due 
to the entry requirement to the host country every six months, their move-
ments will be categorized under circular migration. As Istanbul becomes more 
and more attractive for international business, headquarters of multinational 
corporations will keep setting up there, which will motivate expatriate work-
ers and professionals to migrate to Turkey for work-related purposes. In addi-
tion to foreign professionals, the potential migration to Turkey of highly skilled 
migrants with a Turkish background who are educated in Germany is and will 
be significant. 
Istanbul will keep and even increase its attractiveness for migrants, espe-
cially highly skilled ones. Considering its development, Istanbul will be com-
7 Refik/Kuzubas/Yildiz (2006, pp. 33‒34).
8 Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2011, pp. 107‒128).
9 Ibid. (pp. 122‒123).
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peting with other global cities in attracting international migration flows. Stu-
dent migration will play a crucial role, as well. Due to the lack of cultural and 
language barriers, students from Turkish-speaking countries like Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, etc., will  prefer Turkey for educational  purposes. 
This temporary future potential of students may turn into permanent migra-
tion depending on the work opportunities. 
One can observe heterogeneity to  a great extent within the Black Sea 
Area and the Middle East. Economic forecasts on the future of the Turkish eco-
nomy and Turkey’s neighborhood postulate that this heterogeneous structure 
will continue and become even more intensified since the dynamics of each 
economy are quite diverse. The discrepancies among the countries in the re-
gion can be considered as a sign for a future divergent pattern. The probability 
of these countries to converge is fairly low. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the 
Turkish neighborhood has implications in terms of distribution of gains from 
trade as well as the migration potential.10 Due to the gaps among countries 
with respect to their main macroeconomic indicators, Turkey’s role in man-
aging the migration flows from Middle East and ex-Soviet Union countries is 
of considerable importance. Under this framework, it is possible to foresee that 
migration from the Middle East will keep its importance in the near future and 
may even increase due to the latest developments in the visa policy of Turkey. 
Male migrants will be motivated by the job opportunities in construction, tour-
ism  and  entertainment, whereas  female  migrants  will  be  preferred  for  do-
mestic services. Current migration forms, such as contract-dependent labor mi-
gration and marriage migration, will be persistent in the near future, where 
asylum seeking (in accordance with the possible solution of Kurdish dispute) 
may have a declining trend with the full membership to the EU. 
The migration potential from Turkey to the Middle Eastern countries is 
relatively weak due to the tendencies in the region to employ their own citi-
zens and encourage the young generation to work in the country. 
Challenges and Opportunities 
Push and pull factors behind the potential migration are of great importance. 
With  the  possible  membership  to  the  EU,  Turkey  should  consider  revising 
these factors in their historical context so as to find policy solutions for elimi-
nating the pushing factors and improving the pulling ones. Considering the 
10 Paçacı Elitok/Straubhaar (2010 b).
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low wages and high unemployment as the main pushing factors behind the 
potential for labor migration, Turkey can develop policy measures to deal with 
these issues. This, inevitably, requires structural and institutional reforms that 
stabilize the Turkish economy. Better living standards, which are closer to the 
EU  average,  would  decrease  the  motivation  of  Turks  to  migrate  towards 
Europe. EU membership helps to reach this goal. What we have learnt from the 
EU experience in the past is that if labor has the legal right to move freely, this 
makes people (especially in border areas) more mobile internationally, but it 
does not induce mass migration in itself from one country to another. People’s 
social and cultural ties with their local environment are an important obstacle 
for migration, and this factor has commonly been underestimated from the 
perspective of theoretical economics. Furthermore, it has not been taken into 
account  seriously  enough  in  light  of  the  structural  migration  (forecasting) 
models. Therefore, EU membership might provoke not more but rather less mi-
gration from Turkey to the EU.
The EU intends to control migration, to select migrants on a skill-basis, to 
avoid illegal migration and to sign bilateral agreements so as to correspond to 
the need for immigrating labor force. Turkey, a country, which has waited long 
for EU membership, alters its foreign policy and migration management in a 
manner that improves its relations with its neighbors, especially in the Middle 
East. With respect to visa restrictions, Turkey has been following a liberal visa 
policy since 2005. Several visa-free agreements were signed with neighboring 
countries including Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Russia. The main motivation of 
Turkey was mainly economic gains from more integration in the region, yet its 
liberal visa regime brought the “construction of a new Schengen area in the 
Middle East” under discussion. This alteration stands both as a challenge and 
an opportunity for Turkey and its future perspectives on migration. On the one 
hand, it can be read as a “political message” to the EU, which lately initiated the 
privileged membership as an alternative for Turkey, revealing that there are 
other options for Turkey in its neighborhood for various integration possibil-
ities and unions. On the other hand, within the EU, Turkey’s liberal visa policy 
increased the concerns about the security issues in relation to border manage-
ment, since the free entrance of immigrants both from Middle East and from 
Russia facilitates the potential for illegal and transit migration to Europe via 
Turkey.11 
11 Ibid. (p. 126).
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One of the most crucial challenges for Turkey in its relations with the EU 
is illegal migration. Due to its geographical location, Turkey will be under the 
risk of increasing irregular migration pressure. Potentials for irregular migra-
tion to Turkey (from the Middle East and from ex- Soviet Union countries) and 
the significance of female migration within this flow will continue to be of 
considerable  importance. Kirişçi  (2008)12 emphasizes  the  increasing  import-
ance of managing illegal migration, both as a challenge and as an opportunity, 
for Turkey in the near future, as it has become a transit country. Yet, he postu-
lates that the manner in which “migration” has become securitized by the EU 
has adversely affected the EU-Turkish relations and generated “mistrust” on 
both sides. According to Kirişçi, the EU feels that Turkey is not doing enough to 
combat and prevent illegal transit migration and suspects that Turkey has al-
lowed illegal migrants to use its territory to transit to the EU; and there is fear 
on the Turkish side that the EU intends to use Turkey as a buffer zone for irreg-
ular migrants in line with the EU regulations. Currently, Turkey altered its ap-
proach with respect to migration policy, namely: asylum law, visa regulations, 
illegal migration and human trafficking. In terms of asylum, the two main le-
gislations that are under consideration are the 1994 Asylum Regulation and 
the 2006 Circular stipulating asylum procedure and the rights and obligations 
of refugees and asylum seekers.  Even if Turkey is party to the UN Refugees 
Convention of 1951, it has still not lifted the geographical limitation, namely, 
non-Europeans are not granted refugee status. If it is well managed, the chal-
lenge of  illegal  migration can turn into  an opportunity for  Turkey so as  to 
freshen the negotiations with the EU. Cooperation and dialogue between Tur-
key and the EU with respect to illegal migration would be beneficial for the se-
curity of both sides.13
Turkey is under criticism because of its migration policies being weak, 
unsystematic and temporary. Taking the past as a reference point for the fu-
ture based on the lessons from migration history, Turkey has to re-evaluate its 
own interests and build up policy tools dismissing push factors, particularly in 
transition period, so as to transform migration from being a challenge to being 
an opportunity. There are risks and challenges for Turkey waiting at the gate of 
Europe. It is crucial to recognize the importance of policy-oriented questions 
regarding the push and pull factors and how they changed throughout history 
12 Kirişçi (2008).
13 Ibid. (p. 126).
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and how they influenced migration decisions. Turkey ought to conduct reforms 
on expected emigration and immigration flows as a structural grounding of le-
gislations and institutions in addition to the economic measures discarding 
the pushing factors, such as low wages, economic instability, unemployment 
and  inadequate  working  conditions. Yet, Turkey  must  recognize  the  impor-
tance of migration as a development tool for its own sake (with or without EU 
membership), and should get prepared for short- and long-term effects of ex-
pected migration. It is better for Turkey to realize the importance of immigra-
tion factors during the EU negotiations and restructure its position according 
to its potential benefits from migration flows. The approach of Turkey in the 
1960s, namely, considering migration as a remedy for unemployment and re-
mittances as a source of foreign currency, should be replaced by a more realist-
ic and contemporary future projection so as not to repeat the same mistakes. 
Turkey should seek routes for a transformation from a labor exporter country 
to a labor importer country.
The EU is being criticized due to the lack of common binding frame. Even 
if several steps have been taken so far, Europe is still lacking a common immi-
gration policy  and is  under  criticism due to the  lack  of  consistency among 
European members. The former policies were criticized because of being in-
flexible, non-adaptive, top-down, bureaucratic, too specific  and designed for 
the local needs. It is among the targets of the Lisbon Agenda for the post-2010 
period to create employment opportunities for the unemployed low skilled mi-
grants, to promote the integration of available migrants and to implement a 
shift to a more selective migration policy. Consequently, migration will keep its 
key role in relations of Turkey with the EU – not necessarily for the next fifty 
years but certainly for the next decade.
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